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VOIDED VOWS: ANNULMENT AS A FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
SOLUTION TO THE SAME-SEX DIVORCE CONUNDRUM
KatharineJ. Westfall*
Divorcesaremadeinheaven.1
INTRODUCTION
Forsame-sexcouplesintheUnitedStates, marriagewasanabsolutefantasy
until2003, whenMassachusettsbecamethefirststatetolegalizetheseunions.2 Inthe
interveningdecade, eighteenadditionalstatesandtheDistrictofColumbiahave
validatedmarriagesbetweentwoindividualsofthesamegender.3 However, asthe
long-heldhopeformarriagebecomesareality, formanygayspouses, divorceisthe
new pipedream.4 Legaltheoristshaveputforthseveralpossiblesolutionstothis
marriagetrap, butnearlyalloftheseproposedfixeswouldrequiresignificanttime
andthewillingnessofindividualstatestosubstantiallyrevisetheirdomesticrelations
statutes.5 ThisNoteexploresanoverlooked, butexceedinglyfeasible, alternativeto
traditional divorce for wedlocked6 same-sexcouples: annulment.
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, William andMarySchoolofLaw;B.A., PrincetonUniversity,
2009. I wouldliketothanktheVolume23 editorialstaffforselectingandpreparingthis
Noteforpublication, andmyfamilyandfriendsfortheirconstantencouragement.
1 OSCAR WILDE, The Importance of Being Earnest, in THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING
EARNEST AND OTHER PLAYS 247, 255 (OxfordUniv. Press2008) (1898).
2 OnNovember18, 2003, followingtherulinginGoodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d941 (Mass. 2003), MassachusettsbecamethefirstUnitedStatesjurisdictionto
recognizethelegalrightofgaycouplestomarry. Thenewlawtookeffect180 dayslater. See
KathleenBurge, SJC:Gay Marriage Legal in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2003),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2003/11/18/sjc_gay_marriage
_legal_in_mass/.
3 AsofFebruary2014, seventeenstatesandtheDistrictofColumbiahavelegalized
same-sexmarriage. See DefiningMarriage:State Defense of Marriage Laws and Same-Sex
Marriage, NATL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx#1.
4 See NickTarasen, Comment, Untanglingthe Knot:Findinga Forum for Same-Sex
Divorces in the State of Celebration, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1585, 158586 (2011).
5 See MaryPatriciaByrn& MorganL. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
6 (2012).
6 Id. at 23 (Same-sex couples residing in numerous DOMA states have been told by
courtsthatbecausetheirstateDoMA renderstheirmarriagesvoid, theycannotterminate
their legal marriages. In a word, these couples are wedlocked.).
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Considerthiscommonscenario: A couplemeetsinMassachusettsandmarries.
Twoyearslater, ajobtransferrelocatesthem toTennessee, wheretheybuyahome
andstartafamily. Afterseveralanniversaries, therelationshipdeteriorates, they
separate, fileforano-faultdivorceinTennesseecourt, anddissolvetheirmarriage.
Thisisthegenericdivorcestorywherethepartiesareahusbandandwife. Whenthe
partiesareawifeandwife, orahusbandandhusband, however, suchastraightforward
processisvirtuallyimpossible. Forspousesofthesamegenderlivinginastatethat
doesnotrecognizethelegalityoftheirunion, suchanattemptatdivorcemeets
significantobstacles, frequentlybarringthedissolutionandforcingthecoupleto
remaininanunwantedmarriage.
Thegraduallegalizationofsame-sexmarriageacrossthiscountryhasbegunto
expandtherightsavailabletoapreviouslymarginalizedgroupofpeople. Yetthe
erraticgrowthofthesenew lawshasspurredunanticipateddifficultieswhencon-
frontedwithinconsistencyacrossstatelinesandthefederalism thatvalidatessuch
inconsistency. Theresultisaconversationthatdampensthesuccessofmarriagelaw
amendments, while raising serious issues of how to balance states rights with indi-
vidualprivilegesinanevolvingAmerica. Thedominantquestionishow amarried
couplemaydissolvetheirmarriagewhenthelawsoftheirhomestaterefuseto
acknowledgethelegalformationoftheunderlyingunion.
Currentdatasuggeststhatbetween40% and50% offirstmarriagesinthe
UnitedStatesendindivorce.7 Thereisnoreasontothinkthathomosexualmar-
riages, despitetheirlong, hardfightforexistence, willmeetadifferentstatistical
fate. A 2011 reportbytheUniversity of CaliforniaLos Angeless Williams Institute
estimatedthat1.1% ofsame-sexmarriagesendedannually, comparedwith2% of
heterosexualmarriages.8 Asaresult, manystatecourtswillfindthemselvesatthe
forefrontofalessattractiveandmoredepressinglegalbattle: thefightforsame-sex
divorce.9 Two related theories suggest the advent of a gay divorce boom10: (1) More
same-sexcouplesthaneveraremarried, andthustherearesimplymoremarriages
7 See NATL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA
2012 1 (2012). A parallelstatisticforsame-sexdivorceisnotavailable. Mostdataondivorce
isderivedfrom theU.S. Census, whichonlybeganrecordingsame-sexmarriagesinitslatest
survey(2010). Howeverforanestimatedannual rateofdivorceamongsame-sexcouples,
seeM.V. LEE BADGETT & JODY L. HERMAN, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE PATTERNS OF
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 18 (2011).
8 BADGETT, supra note7, at19. Whenthisdissolutionratewascalculated, same-sex
couplescouldmarryinonlysixstatesandtheDistrictofColumbia, comparedwithnineteen
in2014. See id. at2.
9 AsJesseGreenwroteinafeaturepieceforNewYork Magazine, How do you process
the undoing of a bond that until a moment ago in history you were not allowed to form?
JesseGreen, From I Do to Im Done; With Newfound Rights, Newfound Fears. The
Peculiar Mechanicsand Heartbreakof Gay Divorce, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 24, 2013), http://
nymag.com/news/features/gay-divorce-2013-3/.
10 Id.
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todissolve;11 and (2) once the backlog of long-term and presumably more stable
gay couples have married, [they will leave] the field to the young and impulsive.12
Theproblem isactuallyachievingthedivorce. Statesthatdonotrecognize
same-sexmarriagesarealsoreluctanttodissolvethem outofafearthefact-finding
involvedinasuitfordivorcewillrequirethecourttoacknowledgetheexistenceofa
validmarriage.13 Moreoverthesestatesexpressconcernthatsuitsfordivorcewill
providesame-sexmarriageadvocateswitharoundaboutmeansofcorneringastate
intorewritingitsmarriagelaws.14
A few solutionshavebeensuggestedtohelpsame-sexcouplesnavigatethe
roughwatersofdivorce. Themostbasicsolutionwouldbeforacouple, oratleastone
spouse, torelocatetoastatethatrecognizessame-sexmarriageforpurposesofmeeting
thedivorceresidencyprerequisite,15 andthentofilefordivorceinthatstate. However,
suchmobilityisnotalwaysfeasible;movingcouldtakeapersonawayfrom ajob
andfamily, orcauseanunaffordablefinancialdrain.
A morepracticableversionofthelattersolutionisforstatesthatperform same-
sexmarriagestoalsoprovideanaccessibleforum intheircourtsfornon-residentgay
couplesmarriedinthatjurisdictiontoalsodivorcethere.16 California,17 Vermont,18
Delaware,19 Minnesota,20 andtheDistrictofColumbia21 haverevisedtheirrelevant
11 Id. (notingthattherateofmarriageamongsame-sexcouplesinstatesthatpermititis
quicklyrisingtotherateofmarriageamongheterosexualcouplesinthosestates).
12 Id. AccordingtoanannualreportbytheNationalMarriageProject, thelikelihoodof
filingfordivorcedecreasesby24% incoupleswhomarryaftertheageoftwenty-five. See
NATL MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note7, at74.
13 Discussedinfra PartII.B.
14 See DahliaLithwick& SonjaWest, Texas Hold Em, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2013), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/texas_and_gay_marriage
_will_texas_refusal_to_grant_divorces_to_same_sex.html (Texas, meanwhile, takes the
positionthatbeingforcedtorecognizesame-sexdivorceisnodifferentfrom beingforced
to accept gay marriage.).
15 Forty-sixstatesandtheDistrictofColumbiahavelawsrequiringthatapetitionerfor
divorcehaveresidedinthestatewherehepetitions. Theresidencyrequirementsrange
anywherefrom sixweekstotwoyearsdependingonjurisdiction. See 45(4)FAM. L. Q. 500,
50005 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications
/family_law_quarterly/vol45/4win12_chart4_divorce.authcheckdam.pdf.
16 See Tarasen, supra note4, at1587.
17 Undernormalcircumstances, whenacoupleseeksadivorceinCalifornia, atleastone
partytothemarriagemusthavelivedinthestateforatleastsixmonthspriortofiling. See
CAL. FAM. CODE §2320(a) (West2012). Anupdatedprovisionallowssame-sexcouples
livingoutsidethestatetopetitionfordivorceprovidedthattheirmarriagewassolemnized
inCaliforniaandthatneitherpartylivesinajurisdictionthatcouldotherwisedissolvethe
marriage. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320(b)(1)(2) (West 2012).
18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §592(b) (2011).
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §1504 (2013).
20 MINN. STAT. §518.07(2) (2013).
21 D.C. CODE §16-902(b) (2013).
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statutestocreatesuchlimitedjurisdiction, buttherearenoexemptionsyetinthe
remainingthirteenstates. Theselawswouldpermitpartiestoasame-sexdivorceto
traveltothestatewheretheywerewedonlyforthepurposeofobtainingthedivorce
judgment.22 Whilesuchatheoryisnovelandexciting, itcontinuestopresentsome
unresolvedissuesastopersonaljurisdiction.23
A thirdproposalabolishesthedomicilerulefordivorceinfavorofamore
traditionalminimumcontactspersonaljurisdictionapproach.24 Underthistheory, astate
mayobtainjurisdictionoveranindividualifhetakespartinsufficientactivitiesin
thestatethathecouldreasonablyexpecttobecalledintocourtthere.25 Stilthepotential
remainsthatsomesame-sexcoupleswillnotevenhavethenecessaryminimum
contactsinanystatewillingtoadjudgetheirdivorce. Forexample, theironlyexperi-
enceinasame-sexmarriagestatemayhavebeenwhentheytraveledtothatstatein
ordertowedunderitslaws.
ThisNotetakesanotherstance, attemptingtofindacompromisebetweenthe
individualrightsofthesame-sexcouplesandthefederalistvaluessoimportantto
stateidentity. Lookingtotherelevantstatutesofstatesthatdonotrecognizehomo-
sexualmarriages, andthereasoningofrecentcasesdenyingdivorcetosame-sex
couples, thisNotesuggeststhatcurrentmini-DOMA lawsprovideavehiclefora
state to dissolve a same-sex union without acknowledging the marriages validity, and
whilestillprovidingaccesstotherightsthatariseinatraditionaldivorce. That
vehicleisatraditionalannulment, ajudgmentthroughwhichamarriageisvoidedfrom
thebeginningaspartofajudicialdeclarationgiveninterstaterecognitionunderthe
Constitutions Full Faith and Credit Clause (FF&CC).26
TheNoteadvancesinthreeparts. PartI addressestheinterpretationoftheFF&CC
thatinhibitsaccessibilitytosame-sexdivorce. Itexplainsanexceptiontotheconsti-
tutionalprovisionthatpermitsastatetodenyrecognitiontoforeignrulingsthatviolate
that states public policy. It then breaks down the obstacles that confront a same-sex
coupleseekingadivorceinamini-DOMA27 state, anddiscussesthelegalandprivate
22 See Tarasen, supra note4, at1587 (notingthat, asof2011, fourstateshadpassedlaws
ofthiskindgivingtheircourtslimitedsubjectmatterjurisdictiontohearsuchcases).
23 See id. at1558 (attemptingtoresolvethepersonaljurisdictionquestionandarguing
thatthedomiciliaryrequirementshouldnotapplytocertainsame-sexdivorces).
24 See, e.g., CourtneyG. Joslin, ModernizingDivorce Jurisdiction:Same-SexCouples
and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2011).
25 See Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
publicActs, Records, andjudicialProceedingsofeveryotherState. AndtheCongressmay
bygeneralLawsprescribetheMannerinwhichsuchActs, RecordsandProceedingsshall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.).
27 TheDefenseofMarriageAct, discussedinfra PartI, permitsanystatetodenylegal
confirmationtoasame-sexmarriagesolemnizedinanotherstate, ortoanyrightorclaim
derived from the marriage. The term mini-DOMA refers to individual state statutes
reflectingthisfederalprovision. MargaretTalbot, Nowfor the Mini-DOMAS, NEW YORKER
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consequencesoffailingtodissolveanunwanted, althoughunrecognized, marriage.
PartII explorestheproceduralsimilaritiesandstatutorydistinctionsbetweendivorce
andannulment. Itaddressespossibleresistancetoannulmentsamongsame-sexcouples,
andthenevaluatesthepro-annulmentmessageofstatecourtcaselaw onsame-sex
divorce. PartIII discussesnon-traditionallegalvehiclesbywhichannulledsame-sex
couplescanobtainjudicially-enforcedrightstocustody, support, andproperty. This
finalsectionestablishesthat, throughannulment, same-sexcouplescaneffectively
reachthesamecleanandfairoutcomeastheywouldwithadivorceproceeding.
I. THE PROBLEM OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
ThepublicpolicyexceptiontotheFF&CC,28 while not unique to marriage law,29
hasbecomemostcontroversialinrecentyearsbecauseofitsprevalentuseinthe
oppositiontosame-sexmarriagelegalization. Underthisexception, theseparatestates
arenotobligatedtorecognizemarriagessolemnizedinanotherstateiftheunionis
foundtoviolatepublicpolicy.30 Themostexplicitmanifestationofthisconstitutional
concessionistheDefenseofMarriageAct(DOMA).31 Whiledenialofrecognitionhas
notpresentedaproblem toheterosexualcouples, ithasbecomeatopicofcontroversy
forsame-sexmarriageadvocateswhoquestiontheconstitutionalityoffailingto
requirefullfaithandcreditforhomosexualunions.32
The other side argues that the distinction is due to the fact that marriage is not a
judgment, but (truly) a ministerial act.33 Marriageisessentiallyanagreementbe-
tweentwoprivateparties;whilethestatemustsanctiontheuniontogiveitlegal
viability, thiscertificationinvolvesnopresentationofevidence, disputedinterests, or
othercharacteristicsstandardtothejudicialprocess.34 Thelegalstatusofmarriage
(July2, 2013), htp://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/07/now-for-the-mini
-domas.html.
28 See, e.g., AndrewKoppelman, Same-SexMarriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy,
76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 935 (1998) (In a situation in which a state would ordinarily apply
another forums law . . . the public policy doctrine permits the state nonetheless to prefer its
own law.).
29 Id. at934.
30 Id. at 922 (Ordinarily, marriages that are valid where they are celebrated are valid
everywhere, forallpurposes. Thereisalongstandingexceptiontothisrule, however, incases
where a marriage violates the strong public policy of the forum in which the question arises.).
31 1 U.S.C. §7 (1996), declared unconstitutional by UnitedStatesv. Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
2675 (2013);28 U.S.C. §1738C (1996). ForadescriptionofthisAct, seeinfra notes 3840
andaccompanyingtext.
32 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 28, at 974 ([I]t is doubtful that Congress has the
power thus to nullify the self-executing force of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.).
33 JeffreyL. Rensberger, Same SexMarriages and the Defense of Marriage Act:A Deviant
View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 421 (1998).
34 Id. at 42122.
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in this context has been compared to the Supreme Courts finding that the pro-
ceedingsofadministrativeagenciesareentitledtofullfaithandcreditonlyifthey
are sufficiently judicial in nature.35 Absent adversariness [or] a neutral decision-
maker, the outcome of a legal interaction is not considered a judgment, and is
thereforenotsubjecttoobligatoryinter-staterecognition.36 Simplyput, thelanguage
oftheFF&CC mandatesfullfaithandcreditonlyforjudicialproceedings, andthe
law hasnotdefinedmarriagewithinthatcategory.37
Since1942, theUnitedStatescourtshaveheldthattheFF&CC requiresastate
toenforceadivorcejudgmententeredbyanotherstate, eventhoughthatdivorce
may contradict the enforcing states public policies.38 Thesameisnottrueofmarriages.
WiththeenactmentofDOMA in1996, Congresscreatedamarriageexceptionto
the FF&CC, permitting any state to deny recognition to a same-sex marriage, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship, despite the unions validity under the
lawsofanotherstate.39 The state statutes that replicate this federal lawoften called
mini-DOMA lawscharacterize this exception as based in a states right to promote
itsownpublicpolicy.40
Withtheexceptionoftheuniqueexperienceofsame-sexcouples, marriagetra-
ditionallyhasbeenobtainableinvirtualyanystatewithfew tonoprerequisites.41
Divorcelaws, ontheotherhand, tendtocontainmorestringentconditions. Priorto
theinstitutionofno-faultdivorce, thepetitioningpartyhadtheburdenofestablish-
ingwhyheorshedeservedtohavethemarriagedissolved.42 Furthermore, tothis
35 Id. at422 (citingUnitedStatesv. UtahConstr. & MiningCo., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)).
36 Id. at421.
37 Id.
38 See Williamsv. NorthCarolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (notingthatCongresshad
neverexpressedapublicpolicyexceptiontotheFF&CC thatcovereddivorce). Priorto1942,
themainprecedentonthisissuewasthe1906 caseHaddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906), inwhichtheSupremeCourtheldthat, althoughadecreeofdivorcemayhavebeen
enforceableinthestatewhereitwasentered, thatdidnotmandateinterstateenforcement
undertheFF&CC.
39 28 U.S.C. §1738C (1996).
40 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3101.01 (LexisNexis2013);see also infra notes
6768 and accompanying text.
41 See generally JudithM. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex)Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 447, 449 (2011) ([M]ost states impose no residency requirement for marriage, but
every state requires residency for divorce.); see also id. at449 n.4 (discussingMASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 207, § 19 (2007), which requir[es] a three-daywaitingperiodtoobtainamarriage
licensebutimpos[es]norequirementthatthe parties be Massachusetts residents).
42 Californiapassedthefirstno-faultdivorcelegislationin1969 andwithinthenextten
yearseveryotherstatefollowedsuit. See generally PeterNashSwisher, Marriage and Some
Troubling Issues With No-Fault Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243, 24546 (2005).
Howeveramajorityofstatesintroducedno-faultdivorceasamerealternativetofault-based
divorce, meaning that only a minority of statesabout fifteenare true no-fault divorce
jurisdictions. Id. at249.
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day, divorcestatutescontainsignificantresidencyrequirements.43 Thesedomiciliary
obligationscreatethemostsignificantbarriertodivorceforsame-sexcoupleswho
liveoutsideofthestatethatsolemnizedtheirmarriage.44 Whenseeminglytheonly
availableoptionistorelocatelong-term toastatethatwillrecognizethemarriage
forpurposesofdivorce, formanycouplesthisisreallynooptionatall. AsPartII
ofthisNoteexplains, an annulmentallowsformaritaldissolution withoutthe
upheavalofadivorcesuit.
A. Effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on Same-SexDivorce
The Supreme Courts 2013 holding in United States v. Windsor45 founduncon-
stitutionalSection3 ofDOMA, whichrestrictedthefederaldefinitionofmarriage
toarelationshipbetweenamanandawoman.46 However, theCourtmadenodeci-
sionastoSection2, theaforementionedexceptionclause.47 Thus, whilethefederal
governmentmustnow recognizesame-sexmarriages, recognitionamongtheseparate
statesremainsvaried. Thisinter-statediscrepancyraisessubstantialissuesforsame-sex
coupleswhoseektodissolvetheirunionsinstatesthatareunwillingtoacknowledge
thevalidityofthemarriage.
AsofJuly2013, twenty-ninestateshadconstitutionalamendmentsrestricting
marriagetoheterosexualunions, andsixstateshadgenerallawstothesameeffect.48
Nearlyallofthesestatutesgosofarastodenyrecognitiontosame-sexmarriages
legallycertifiedinotherjurisdictions.49 Same-sexcoupleslivinginstatesthatrecog-
nizetheirmarriagefinddivorcerelativelysimple. Forinstance, whengaymarriage
becamelegalinRhodeIslandonAugust1, 2013, thestateinstantlysaw itsfirst
filingsforsame-sexdivorce.50 Incontrast, theconfusionofcoupleslivinginnon-
recognizingstatesiscleverlydepictedbythistrainridestory:
43 Forexample, Virginialaw requiresthat, tomaintainadivorceaction, atleastoneof
the parties must have been an actual bona fide resident and domiciliary of [the] Commonwealth
for at least six months prior to the filing of the suit. VA. CODE ANN. §20-97 (2013);see also
discussionsupra note15.
44 See Joslin, supra note 24, at 171112.
45 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
46 1 U.S.C. §7 (1996).
47 28 U.S.C. §1738C (1996).
48 See Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (July2, 2013),
http://www.hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/assets/resources/marriage
-prohibitions_6-10-2014.pdf.
49 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §30-1-19 (LexisNexis2013);see also infra note70 andaccom-
panyingtext.
50 See RI Couples Use New Marriage Law to Get Divorced, U-T SAN DIEGO (Aug. 2,
2013), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/aug/02/ri-couples-use-new-marriage-law-to
-get-divorced/.
338 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:331
Imagine youre a same-sex couple married in Washington, D.C.,
and taking the Amtrak from there to Boston . . . Youre married
in D.C.; everythings fine. . . . Then you get to Pennsylvania,
whichhasnotbeenrecognizingtheseout-of-statemarriagesas
anythingatall, andnotallowingdivorces, sowhilethereyouare
potentialy a legal stranger to your spouse. Thats not a good part
ofyourtrip. New Jerseyrecognizesyourmarriageonlyasacivil
union. Then, phew, youre in New York and youre married again;
sameinConnecticut. . . . Finally, youreachMassachusetts, and
you can breathe a sigh of relief: Youre married. And you can
divorce. But its a very complicated legal ride.51
Consideronefurtherconsequenceoftheinter-statedeviation: A spouseina
contested divorce opposed to the dissolution may use a states public policy against
therecognitionofsame-sexmarriagetopreventthepetitioningspousefrom suc-
ceedingincourt.52 InOctober2013, awomanwhohadbeenlegallymarriedtoher
same-sexpartnerunderCalifornialaw, andnow residedinMississippiwithher
spouse, used this tactic when she asked a Mississippi court to dismiss her wifes
petitionforadivorce.53 Thepetitionwasfault-based, allegingadulteryandcruelty
bythecontestingspouse.54 Ifthecourtdismissedthepetitiononpublicpolicygrounds
thatthemarriageneverlegallyexistedinMississippi, thejusticesystem mighttrap
thepetitioningspouseinanabusiverelationship. Thisscenariopromptsanecessary
societalconcernabouttheriskthattheinconsistentavailabilityofsame-sexdivorce
mayconfineindividualstounwanted, sometimesunsafe, domesticsituations.
B. The Need for Judicial Dissolution Despite a Domiciliary States Refusal to
Recognize Same-SexMarriage
Atfirstglance, officiallyterminatingasame-sexmarriagemayseem unneces-
sarywhenthespousesresideinajurisdictionthatalreadyconsidersthem unmarried.
However, thefactthatanunrecognizedsame-sexmarriagetheoreticallydoesnot
existinonestatedoesnotprecludeitsongoingexistenceinamoresympathetic
jurisdiction.55 Weightyconcernsthereforearisefrom leavingamarriagelegally
intact despite the spouses preference to be free of it.
51 See Green, supra note9 (quotingSusanSommer, DirectorofConstitutionalLitigation
forLambdaLegal).
52 See, e.g., Woman Asks Mississippi Court to Dismiss Same-SexDivorce Case from
California Wedding, GULF LIVE (Oct. 2, 2013), http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press
-news//print.html?entry=/2013/10/woman_asks_mississippi_court_t.html.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See Byrn& Holcomb, supra note 5, at 34.
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Outside the parties non-recognizing residential state, several issues will surface.
Imagine a homosexual couple in New Mexicowhere same-sex marriage is not
recognizedwho have agreed between themselves that their marriage is over, but
havenotbeenabletoobtainalegaldeclarationofthatdecision. Sometimethereaf-
ter, onespousetravelstoSanFranciscoforwork. Thelaw ofCaliforniastillconsid-
ersthecouplelegallymarried. Thetravelingspouseisinvolved in atragiccar
accidentthatleaveshim comatoseinaCaliforniahospital. Despitetheprivately
agreed dissolution and the unions virtual non-existence in the domiciliary state of
New Mexico, Californias ongoing recognition of the marriage confers certain
crucialandcontroversialrightsontheotherspouse, suchasthedecisionwhetherto
removelifesupport.56
Perhapsmorelikelytoimpactthelivesofaformercoupleisthefactthat, ifthey
donotlegallydissolvetheirmarriage, neitherpartywillbeabletoremarry.57 Infact
ifonespouseweretoleavethestateofdomicileandattemptremarriageinastate
thatallowssame-sexunions, thatstatewouldalmostdefinitelyrenderanysecond
marriage(andnotthefirstone) voidab initio underastatutorybanonpolygamy.58
Furthermore, the Supreme Courts 2013 holding in Windsor59 createsdifficulties
forthesecouplesonafederalscale. Section3 ofDOMA now encompassessame-
sexspouses, allowingmarriedgaycouplesaccesstothesamefederalbenefitsthat
individualsinheterosexualmarriageshavealwaysreceived.60 As long as a couples
marriagewasperformedlegallyandhasnotbeendissolvedbyacourt, spousescan
receivecertainfederalbenefitsthattheywouldnotreceiveassingleindividuals.61
Withoutalegalendtothemarriage, thespouseswillunfairlymaintainongoingpriv-
ilegesbasedinthemarriage, suchasfederalbenefitsfrom sharedrightsinintellec-
tualproperty.62 Additionally, from ataxpayerstandpoint, theideathatthefederal
governmentmayprovidewhatareprimarilyfinancialbenefitstoacouplethatno
longerintendstoholditselfoutasmarriedseemsunjustandevenwasteful. Same-
sexspouseshopingtoexittheirmaritalcommitmentthereforehaveeveryreasonto
seekthemostefficientandeffectivejudicialdeclarationthattheirlegalrelationship
hasterminated.
56 See Tarasen, supra note4, at1586.
57 See Byrn& Holcomb, supra note5, at4.
58 See id. at 45 n.10 (citing Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 2012)).
59 See UnitedStatesv. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
60 See generally Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bolsters Gay Marriage With Two Major
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, June27, 2013, atA1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06
/27/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-marriage.html.
61 Id.
62 See Why Civil Unions Are Not Enough, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/WhyCivilUnionsAreNot
Enough.pdf.
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II. ANNULMENT AS A FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
ALTERNATIVE TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE
Asdiscussedabove, thelaw ofthiscountryhasnotperceivedmarriageasa
traditionally judicialactthatmustbeenforced inter-stateundertheFF&CC.63
Conversely, divorce generally involves adversariness [or] a neutral decisionmaker
with the power to grant or deny relief, which are the hallmarks of a judicial
proceeding.64 Asaresult, ajudgmentofdivorceisenforceableacrossstatelines.65
Same-sex partiesas well as heterosexual partiesrequire an official judicial dec-
larationforthepurposeofterminatingtheirmarriagenotonlyinthestatewherethey
reside, butnationwide.66
Courtsinmini-DOMA statesentertainingrequeststodivorcesame-sexcouples
whowerewedinotherjurisdictionsexpresstheconcernthatinthecourseofthe
proceedingsthecourtwillnecessarilyberequiredtomakeafactualfindingthatthe
marriageexisted, evenifsolelyforthepurposeofdissolvingit.67 Thesecourtslikely
fearthatsuchadecisionwillviolatethepublicpolicyofthestate, orinadvertently
createnew law withregardtothatpublicpolicy.68
Thetricktomaneuveringthisawkwardsituationisstrikingabalancebetween
thelegalrightsofindividualstobefreed from an unwanted marriage, and the
constitutionalrightsofthestatestomaintaintheirownlawsindependentoftheir
sisterstates. Giventhecurrentlaw, themostaccessibleandefficientsolutionshould
focusonstatutoryprovisionsforannulment.
Anannulmentisdefinedas:
A judicial. . . declarationthatamarriageisvoid. Anannulment
establishesthatthemaritalstatusneverexisted. Soannulment
and dissolution ofmarriage (ordivorce) are fundamentally
different: anannulmentrendersamarriagevoidfrom thebegin-
ning, whiledissolutionofmarriageterminatesthemarriageasof
thedateofthejudgmentofdissolution.69
The terms implicit meaningisthatapetitiontoannulasame-sexmarriagewould
notcompelacourttorecognizethemarriageforanypurposewhatsoever. Rather,
anannulmentinherentlydeniesrecognitiontoamaritalrelationship.
63 See supra notes 2837 and accompanying text; Rensberger, supra note33, at421.
64 See Rensberger, supra note33, at421.
65 See Williamsv. NorthCarolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
66 See id.
67 See, e.g., In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d654, 664 (Tex. App. 2010).
68 See, e.g., Lithwick& West, supra note14.
69 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 106 (9thed. 2009).
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Thestatutesofmanystatesprovideanaturalchannelforsuchpractice;theterm
void, which appears in the above definition, is also writen front and center (either
literallyorsynonymously) intomarriagestatutesinthemajorityofstatesthatex-
plicitly oppose recognition of same-sex unions. For example, Alabama [will] not
recognizeasvalidanymarriageofpartiesofthesamesexthatoccurredorwas
alegedtohaveoccurredasaresultofthelawofanyjurisdictionregardlessofwhether
a marriage license was issued.70
Notonlydoesanannulmentnotrequirea finding on the marriages initial legiti-
macy, butasajudicialdeclaration italso meetstherequirementsforinterstate
recognitionundertheFF&CC.71 Thisisacrucialaspectofitsrelevancetosame-sex
couplesseekingauniversallyrecognizeddissolution. Couldinterstateenforcement
ofanannulmentimplicatepublicpolicyconcerns? Perhaps, butsuchahypothetical
seemsveryunlikely. A statethathaslegalizedsame-sexmarriagecouldtheoretically
choosenottorecognizean annulmentgranted byastatewith opposingviews.
However, suchanapproachwoulddefylogic. Althoughstatesthatgrantsame-sex
marriagespromoteapublicpolicyofsupportforsame-sexunions, itishardto
conceiveofanargumentthattheirpolicyextendstocontrollingthedecisionsmade
withinindividualsame-sexrelationships. Afterall, acouplethathasreceivedan
annulmentinthisscenariowillhavepetitionedforit, anindicatorthatthecouplehas
chosenpersonallytodissolvetheirmarriageinsuchamanner. Forthesereasons, an
annulmentisnotonlyeasilysought, itisalsoanearlycertainguaranteethatthemarital
dissolutionwillreceivenationwiderecognition.
A. DispellingPotential Resistance to the Annulment Alternative
Aswithanynewlegalproposition, therearepotentialimpedimentstoencourag-
ingannulmentasaneffectivetoolfordissolvingsame-sexmarriagesoutsideofa
70 ALA. CODE §30-1-19 (LexisNexis2013). Forsimilarlanguageinotherstatestatutes,
see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2013) (Any marriage entered into by persons of the
samesexpursuanttoamarriagelicenseissuedbyanotherstateorforeignjurisdictionor
otherwise shall be void in [Georgia].); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §402.045 (LexisNexis2013)
(A marriage between members of the same sex which occurs in another jurisdiction shall
be void in Kentucky); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (LexisNexis 2013) (Any marriage
betweenpersonsofthesamesexisagainstthestrongpublicpolicyofthisstate. Any
marriagebetweenpersonsofthesamesexshallhavenolegalforceoreffectinthisstateand,
ifattemptedtobeenteredintointhisstate, isvoidabinitioandshallnotberecognizedby
this state.). For interpretive purposes, note that the Merriam-Webster Thesaurus lists
invalid as a synonym to void. MERRIAM WEBSTERS THESAURUS, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/thesaurus/void.
71 LeonGabinet, Refusal to Grant Same-SexDivorce:Uncertainty in Tax, Property, and
Marital Status Issues, 29 J.TAXN INVESTMENT.67,87 n.65 (2011) (citingSuttonv. Lieb, 342
U.S. 402, 406 (1952)).
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ceremonialstate. Aninitialproblem issimplythatpartiesmaynotbeawareofan-
nulmentasanoption. Foronething, asignificantproportionofindividualsinvolved
inmarriagedissolutionsuitsdonotretainalawyer. Statisticsonself-representation
arescattered, butwhenstateshaveconductedstudiesintothisissue, theresultscon-
sistentlyindicateacommontrendofpro se litigantsinfamilycourt.72 In2006 the
NationalCenterforStateCourtscompiledstatisticscollectedfrom arangeofstate
courtsystems.73 Forexample, accordingtothatreport, 49% ofpetitionersand81%
ofrespondentsinUtahdivorcecaseswerepro se,74 andUtahwasnottheonlystate
withstatisticsfolowingsuchapattern.75 Becausedivorceisthemosttraditionalmeans
of dissolving a marriage, without the assistance of counsel familiar with a states pro-
ceduraldoctrine, manyseparatingpartiesareunlikelytorecognizeannulmentasa
feasibleanswertotheirproblem.
Anotherpotentialissueistheculturalassociationofannulmentswithreligious,
ratherthanlegal, decisionmaking.76 TheCatholicChurch, whosedoctrineprohibits
divorce for church members, grants annulments when it finds that something
contrarytothenatureofmarriageortoafull, freehumandecisionprevents[the
marriage] contract from being sound or binding.77 However, achurchannulmentisnot
legallybinding;whileitenablesaperson toremain in good standing with the
Churchandtofreelyremarrywithinthefaith, theannulmenthasnobearingonthe
lawsofthestates.78 Forthatreason, ajudicialrulingonthemarriageisstillneces-
saryforthecompletionofaseculardissolution. Manyparties, inparticularthose
72 See, e.g., Pro Se Statistics, TEX.ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMN, http://www.texasatj.org
/files/file/3ProSeStatisticsSummary.pdf(estimatingthatfrom2010 to2011, self-represented
litigantswereresponsiblefor21.6% offilingsinTexasfamilycourts, andthepercentagewas
muchhigherwhenseparatedbycounty).
73 See MadelynnHerman, Self-Representation:Pro Se Statistics Memorandum, NATL.
CTR.FOR STATECTS. (Sept. 25, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20120504035215/http://
www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo.htm#statecourt.
74 Id.
75 TheNationalCenterforStateCourtsreportofferedfurtherdata. Forexample, a2000
CaliforniainvestigationfoundthatinSanDiego77% ofdivorcefilingsinvolvedonepro se
litigant, andsomecountiesinWisconsinseeasmanyas70% offamilycourtcasesinvolving
self-representation. See id. Itisworthnoting, though, thatnotallofthestatesdiscussedin
thestudyarestateswithmini-DOMA laws;some, suchasCalifornia, havelegalizedsame-
sexmarriage.
76 TheMerriam-WebsterDictionarydefinesannulment as a judicialorecclesiastical
pronouncement declaring a marriage invalid. MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY,http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/annulment.
77 JosephM. Champlin, Ten Questions About Annulment, AM. CATHOLIC, http://www
.web.archive.org/web/20140404151248/http://www.americancatholic.org/newsletters/cu
/ac1002.asp(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
78 Generaly, areligiousannulmentoccursonlyaftercivildissolutionhasoccurred. See id.
(When couples do separate and divorce, therefore, the Church examines in detail their marriage
to determine if, right from the start, some essential element was missing in their relationship.).
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withoutrepresentation, maybeunawarethatannulmentisanoptionthroughthe
judicialsystem, aswell.
Perhapsthemostsignificantbarriertoconvincingsame-sexcouplestopursue
annulmentsissimplythemeaningthatisbothpersonallyandsociallyembodiedin
the word divorcethe fact that at one time the parties were legally married.79
Whileconstitutionalargumentsofequalprotectionandthefundamentalrightto
marrydrivemuchofthesame-sexmarriagemovement, asignificantsubargument
focusesonthebasicsocialimportanceofbeingidentifiedasamarriedcouple, as
opposedtotwoindividualsunitedinadomesticpartnership, civilunion, oranything
elsebyanothername.80 A 2012 opinionpieceforThe New York Times suggested
thatasolelylegalview ofthesame-sexmarriageargumentlackedacrucialelement:
[M]arriages social meaning makes it possible for couples to
communicateinformationabouttheirrelationshipsinaparticularly
effectiveway. Thisisimportantbecausepeopledonotonlycare
abouttangiblebenefits(suchasmoneyorhealthcareorthelike);
theycareaboutintangiblebenefitsaswell. Inparticular, people
care deeply about how they are regarded by otherswhich in-
evitablydependsontheinformationaboutthem thatissharedin
theircommunity.81
Thesameissueofsocialmeaninglogicallyholdstrueinthecontextofdissolv-
ingamarriage. A couplethatchoosestoseparateismakingadecisionperceivedas
bestforthetwopeopledirectlyinvolved. Thecoupleislikelynot, however, looking
tounderminethefightformarriageequality. Manysame-sexcouples, alertedtothe
factthatanannulmentendsamarriagewiththelegalfictionthatthemarriagesome-
how neverexisted(andneverhadanylegitimaterighttoexist), mayresistannulment
asaneffectivemeansofdissolutiononthegroundsthatitviolatesthesubstanceof
themovementthatenabledtheirmarriage, andmanyothermarriages, inthefirst
place. Despitethesepotentialand legitimatereasons for resistance, annulment
remainsthemostaccessible, efficient, andeffectivemeansofdissolvingamarriage
formanysame-sexcoupleslivingunderthepowerfulhandofDOMA.
79 Interestingly, itisreallyjustapermutationofthisconcernthatcourtsexpressasthe
rootoftheirunwillingnesstograntsame-sex divorcesdoing so wouldmeanacceptingthe
underlyingmarriage.
80 See RalphWedgwood, The Meaningof Same-SexMarriage, N.Y. TIMES (May24,
2012, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/marriage-meaning-and
-equality/ ([M]arriage is fundamentally a traditional way of life that possesses a certain social
meaning. Thissocialmeaningconsistsofthewebofsharedunderstandingsandexpectations
that have built up over centuries.).
81 Id.
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B. State Court Attitudes Towards AnnullingSame-SexMarriages
Themajorityofcaselaw relevanttothisissuefocusesonpetitionsforsame-sex
divorce, whichhavebeenhandleddifferentlydependingonthejurisdiction.82 Sug-
gestionsofannulmentasamorefeasiblealternativearisemostcommonlyinthedicta
ofthesecases.83 In2013 theSupremeCourtofTexasheardtwoprominentcases
regarding the states ability to grant divorces to same-sex couples without recognizing
theirmarriages, whichwouldbeinviolationofTexaspublicpolicy.84 Theultimate
outcomeofthesecasesisofminimalrelevancetothisNote.85 Rather, thediscussion
inbothcasesduringlowerstateappellatereview providedaclearlookatthecom-
fortabledistinctionamini-DOMA statetendstofindingrantingannulmentsrather
thandivorces.
IntheDalascaseIn re J.B., J.B. filedforadivorcefrom hishusband, H.B., whom
hehadwedinMassachusettsin2006.86 Thestateintervenedalmostimmediately,
callinguponitsrighttoopposethedivorcepetitionwiththepurposeofdefending
theconstitutionalityofTexaslaw.87 Despite the states argument that the trial court
lackedsubject-matterjurisdictiononthegroundsthatnolegitimatemarriageexisted
betweenJ.B. andH.B., thetrialcourtheldthatitdidinfacthavetheauthorityto
considerthepetition, andthatthestatehadnobasisonwhichtointervene.88
Onreview, thestateappellatecourtaddressedtwomainissues: (1) thedistinc-
tionbetweensuitsfordivorceandsuitsdeclaringamarriagevoid;89 and(2) whether
grantingadivorceinherentlyinvolvesrecognitionofavalidunderlyingmarriage.90
82 See, e.g., Atwoodv. Riviotta, 1 CA-CV 12-0280, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 567
(Ariz. Ct. App. May16, 2013);In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d654 (Tex. App. 2010).
83 See, e.g., Atwood, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 567, at*2.
84 See JordanSmith, Texas Supreme Court Considers Same-SexDivorce,AUSTINCHRON.
(Nov. 5, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2013-11-05/texas
-supreme-court-considers-same-sex-divorce/.
85 OnFebruary26, 2014 afederalcourtjudgeissuedarulingthattheTexasbanonsame-
sexmarriagewasunconstitutional. See MannyFernandez, Federal Judge Strikes Down
Texas Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, atA14. Thereiscurrently
a stay on this decision pending the state partys appeal to the Fifth Circuit. See id. Theauthor
wishestonotethatthefutureofsame-sexmarriageinTexashasnobearingontheargument
presentedbythisNote. ThetwoTexascasesexploredhereinservesimplyasstrongpara-
digmsforthelegalthoughtprocessesofvirtuallyanymini-DOMA stateconfrontedbythe
issueofdivorce.
86 In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 65960.
89 Id. at 663 (Appellee did not plead for a declaration of voidness. Rather, he soughta
divorce on the ground of insupportability.).
90 Id. at 666 ([I]n order to prevail, appellee must show that a same-sex divorce gives no
effect at all to the purported same-sex marriage.).
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As to the first question, the court emphasized the laws explicit distinction between
thetypesofmarriagedissolutionsuitsandnotedthatasame-sexmarriageisvoid
atitsinception.91 Elaborating, thecourtlookedtolegislativeintentinthelanguage
of the states mini-DOMA statute,92 a prohibition on giving legal effect even to a
claim . . . predicated on a same-sex marriage.93 Then, turningtothedictionary
definition of the word claim, the court found that [a] petition for divorce is a
claimthat is, a demand of a right or supposed right, and therefore fell outside
of the courts jurisdiction.94
With regard to the second question, the court determined that [a] suit for
divorce presumes a valid marriage.95 Itconcludedthateventoconsiderthedivorce
petitionsolelyforthepurposeofdenialwouldgivelegalvaliditytothemarriageon
whichtherequestwasbased.96 Assupportforitsconclusion, thecourtprovided
examplesofthespecificmeansbywhichsuitsfordivorcepresumemarriagevalidity,
such as the petitioners burden at trial to offer evidence that he or she was legally
marriedtotheotherparty.97
Having affirmed the trial courts dismissal of J.B.s petition, the appellate court
brieflyevaluatedanothercourseofdissolutiononwhichitmighthavereacheda
differentoutcome.98 Thecourtunambiguouslyexpresseditsview thatasuittodeclare
amarriagevoidinnowaygiveseffecttothemarriage;ratheritassertsthatamarriage
neverexisted.99 Itfurtherobservedthatanyordersarisingoutofsuchaproceeding,
such as restraining orders and name changes . . . merely facilitate the disentangle-
ment of the parties affairs.100
TheAustincase, State v. Naylor,101 reachedamarkedlydifferentoutcomeand
waslessvocalastodivorcealternatives, yetequalysuggestive. InNaylor, Angelique
Naylorfiledforadivorcefrom SabinaDaly, whom shehadlegallymarriedin
Massachusettsfiveyearsearlier.102 Inresponse, Dalypetitionedthecourttoinstead
declaretheirmarriagevoidunderTexaslaw.103 In contradiction to the Dallas courts
91 Id. at663.
92 Id. at 66465.
93 Id. at665 (paraphrasingTEX. FAM. CODE §6-204(c)(2)).
94 Id. (quotingWEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 414 (1981)).
95 Id. at666 (quotingGrayv. Gray, 354 S.W.2d948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)).
96 Id. at665.
97 Id. at666 (quotingGray, 354 S.W.2dat949). Thecourtofferedotherexamples, in-
cluding the fact that [a]n obvious purpose and function of the divorce proceeding is to
determine and resolve legal obligations . . . arising from or affected by their marriage. Id.
at667.
98 Id. at667.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 330 S.W.3d434 (Tex. App. 2011).
102 Id. at436.
103 Id. (citingTEX. FAM. CODE §6.204(b) (West2006)).
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dismissalinJ.B., the Austin trial court entered a divorce decree per Naylors initial
request.104 Followingfinaljudgment, likeinJ.B., thestateintervenedandfileda
noticeofappeal, asserting itsrightto defend theconstitutionalityofthemini-
DOMA statute.105 Thestateclaimedithadnotintervenedsoonerbecauseitexpected
thatDalywouldbeheardonherpetitionforvoidanceandthatherargumentwould
take the form of a defense of the statutes constitutionality.106
Theappellatecourtsubsequentlyheldthatthestatehadnorighttointervene, on
thegroundsthatneitherNaylornorDalyhadmadeanyexplicitconstitutionalargu-
ment.107 The court refused to read Naylors request for divorce as an implied
constitutional attack, and further reasoned that Daly could not have had any reason
todefendthestatuteifithadneverbeenunderattack.108 [A] request for relief under
a statute[,] the court held, is not the equivalent of a defense of that statute from
hypothetical constitutional attack.109 WhiletheNaylor courtsurprisinglygranted
the divorce petition, its discussion of Dalys move to instead void the marriage is
enlightening as to a courts interpretation of a same-sex partys request for annul-
ment. First, Dalys decision to file for voidance suggests some awareness that in a
mini-DOMA state, thismaneuverhadamorelikelychanceofsuccess. Second, the
Courts notation that Daly merely sought relief, and had no intention of waging
constitutional war, proposes that the court recognized Texass mini-DOMA law as
providingalogicalproceduralmeansfordissolvingasame-sexunion.
Consolidated, Naylor andJ.B. camebeforetheTexasSupremeCourtforultimate
stateconsiderationinNovember2013.110 Atoralargument, thedeputyattorneygen-
eral yet again emphasized the states stance on same-sex divorce: Texas law does not
recognize those marriages . . . [They are] void for all purposes in Texas.111 That
104 Id. at437.
105 Id. at 43536.
Thestateoranagencyorpoliticalsubdivisionofthestatemaynotgive
effecttoa: (1) publicact, record, orjudicialproceedingthatcreates,
recognizes, orvalidatesamarriagebetweenpersonsofthesamesexor
acivilunioninthisstateorinanyotherjurisdiction;or(2) rightor
claim toanylegalprotection, benefit, orresponsibilityassertedasa
resultofamarriagebetweenpersonsofthesamesexoracivilunion
inthisstateorinanyotherjurisdiction.
TEX. FAM. CODE §6.204(c)(1-2);see id. at441.
106 Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 441 (According to the State, it was virtually represented by
Daly until she abandoned her defense of the statute.).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at443.
110 See Smith, supra note84.
111 See TerrenceStutz, Texas Supreme Court Considers Whether to Allow Same-Sex
Divorces, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013, 10:50 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com
/news/politics/headlines/20131105-texas-supreme-court-considers-whether-to-allow-same
-sex-divorces.ece.
2014] VOIDED VOWS: ANNULMENT AS A SOLUTION 347
isbased on the language of the statute and lower court dictavoid for al purposes
exceptthepurposeofseekingajudicialdeclarationofvoidness. Embeddedinthevery
argumentofmarriage/divorceopponentsisalegitimatelyfeasible, butunder-utilized
vehicleforsame-sexcouplestoendtheirmarriageswithatacticthatculminatesin
fullfaithandcredit.
Likeanyissueenvelopedinthesame-sexmarriagedebate, attitudestowardsdis-
solutionhavebeeninfluencedbytheevolutionofperspectivesovertime. Initially,
resistance to annuling gay marriages was sometimes as strong as todays resistance to
divorcejudgments.112 Oneexampleisthe2005 caseLane v. Albanese, inwhicha
Connecticutappealscourtheldthatalowercourthadreasonablydeniedasame-sex
couples petition for annulment on the grounds that (1) Connecticuts public policy
(atthattime)113 preventedtherecognitionofasame-sexmarriageperformedunder
Massachusettslaw,114 and that (2) the marriage was not valid from its inception, but
null and void, and, therefore, Connecticut ha[d] nothing to dissolve or annul.115
However, assupportforthisstatementofinvalidity, thecourtreliedonthe
petitioners initial argument that their marriage should be annulled because it vio-
latedathen-existingMassachusettsstatutewhichprohibitedsame-sexcouplesfrom
obtainingMassachusettsmarriagelicensesiftheywereresidentsofastatewhose
publicpolicydirectlyopposedsame-sexmarriage.116 Thereasoningofthiscase
rendersitananomaly. TheConnecticutcourtcouldhaveinsteadreflectedonitsown
publicpolicyofnon-recognitionforsame-sexmarriages, yetitchosetoavoidsuch
adiscussionaltogether.
Thisdecisionmayhavebeenlessalegalconclusionandmoreameansofavoid-
inghastyjudicialactivism. ComparedtothelateractionsofanArizonacourt,117
Lane comes out relatively neutral with its decision not to incorporate the states own
policiesastheprimarymotivefortheoutcome. Thiscomparativelyhands-offap-
proachwaslikelyavagueforeshadowingof2008, whenConnecticutbecamethe
thirdstatetolegalizesame-sexmarriage.118
Over the past few years, various courtsin addition to the Texas tribunals
discussed abovehave explored in more depth the idea that same-sex marriages are
voidsaveforthepurposeofdeclaringvoidness. Ina2011 proceedingconcerning
anactualrequestforannulment, AprilAtwoodpetitionedanArizonasuperiorcourt
112 See, e.g., Lanev. Albanese, FA0440021285, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 759 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2005).
113 Connecticutsubsequentlylegalizedsame-sexmarriagein2008. See infra note118.
114 See Lanev. Albanese, FA044002128S, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 759, at*13.
115 See id.
116 See id. at **1213.
117 See infra notes 11924 and accompanying text.
118 See generally, RoseArce& EliseZeiger, Connecticut Supreme Court Legalizes Same-
SexMarriage,CNN(Oct.10, 2008, 5:07PM), http:/www.cnn.com/2008/US/10/10/connecticut
.gay.marriage/.
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todeclarevoidhersame-sexmarriagetoRainaRiviotta, whichtheyhadlegally
solemnizedunderCalifornialawin2008.119 Thetrialcourtdismissedthecaseonthe
groundsthatitdidnothavethejurisdictionalpowertogranttheannulmentbecause
of Arizonas policy against same-sex marriage.120 Takingtheissueonestepfurther
thanthecourtsconsideringdivorceinJ.B., thetrialjudgeheldthathecouldnot
evendeclarethemarriagevoidwithoutfirstrecognizingitsinitiallegitimacy.121
However, theappellateopinionreasonedtothecontrary, inanalmostverbatim
iterationoftheJ.B. dictaastodeclarationsofvoidness.122 Notingthatthetrialcourt
decisioneffectivelycontradictedtheveryessenceofanannulment, theappellate
courtheldthatgrantinganannulmentwouldnotobligateArizonatorecognizethe
legitimacy of the parties union because an action to annulamarriageisbasedon
the premise that the marriage is void.123 Theappellatecourtremandedthecaseto
beretriedconsistentwiththisinterpretation.124
Although there are potentially inefficient aspects of an annulmentnamely the use
ofhotchpotchclaimsasthemostreliablemeansofestablishingpostdissolution
rights125the language of these cases suggests that an annulment itself may be the
mostefficientoptionformaritaldissolutioninmini-DOMA states, insomecasesthe
differencebetweenarelativelyquickterminationofthemarriageandyearsofwait
timecharacterizedbyattemptedstateinterventionandoneappealafteranother.126
III. RIGHTS ARISING AT DIVORCE TRANSLATE TO ANNULMENT
Thereismoretoamaritaldissolutionthanjustalegalunbindingoftheparties,
anddivorceprovidesastraightforward, standardizedprocessforex-spousestodivide
theirproperty, gainfinancialsupport, andestablishtheirrolesasindividualparents.
119 See Atwoodv. Riviotta, 1 CA-CV 12-0280, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 567 (Ariz.
Ct. App. May16, 2013).
120 See id. at **12.
121 See id. at*3.
122 Compare id., with In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d654, 667 (Tex. App. 2010).
123 See Atwood, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 567 at*3.
124 See id. at*4. A decisiveoutcomeinthetrialcourtisstillpending;thisdecisionis
subjecttofurtherappellatereview. See also In re Surnamer, 1 CA-CV 11-0504, 2012 Ariz.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 852, at*8 (Ariz. Ct. App. July12, 2012). InSurnamer, theArizona
CourtofAppealsalsofoundthatthetrialcourthaderredindenyinganannulmenttoasame-
sexcouplelegallywedinCanada, goingsofarastoholdthatthecourthadtheauthorityto
divide the parties property even on a finding that the marriage had never legally existed. Id.
125 See infra PartIII.
126 IntheDallascase, In re J.B., 326 S.W.3dat659, theinitialpetitionfordivorcewas
filedin2008 andthecoupleis still awaiting the Texas Supreme Courts final judgment. The
petitioningspouseintheAustincase, State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d434 (Tex. App. 2011), first
soughtadivorcein2009.
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A same-sexpartymaybereluctanttopursueanannulmentontheassumptionthatshe
willlosetheabilitytohavesuchdecisionsjudiciallygovernedandenforced. Indeed,
historically, courtsfoundthemselvespowerlesstoaddressanumberoftheserights
aftergrantinganannulment.127 Forinstance:
Byanoverwhelmingnumber, thecourtsofthevariousstates
haveheldthatintheabsenceofanystatutegrantingauthorityto
thecourttoawardalimonyinconnectionwithadecreeofannul-
ment, thecourtispowerlesstodosoirrespectiveofthefaultor
wrongdoingofeitherparty.128
However, thegrowingprevalenceinoursocietyofnon-traditionaldomestic
relationships,129 coupledwithareluctancetodenyindividualsthepropertytheyin
goodfaithbelievetobetheirs, hasledcourtstoincreasinglyacceptrequestsforpost-
dissolutionrightsinnondivorceproceedingsonthetheoryofequitabledistribution
orotheridealsoffairness.130 Whiledivorceoffersasignificantlycleanerandmore
efficientdivisionoftheserights, acouplethatseparatesthroughannulmentisnot
withoutoptions.
Wherecourtshaveacknowledgedtheserightsinnonmaritalrelationships, they
havesignificantlyfocusedtheirdecisionsincontractlaw.131 Forthisreason, married
same-sexcoupleswhoresideinastatewheretheirmarriageisvoid, wouldbe
advisedtoenterintoeitheraprenuptialorpostnuptialcontractdraftedtoconsider
the parties roles as contributors to the marriage, their claim to certain property, and
themannerinwhichtheyanticipateparentinganychildrenshouldtheyseparate.132
Theabilityofsame-sexpartiestomaneuverthejudicialsystem totheiradvantage
dependsheavilyonwhetherornottheyhavecreatedareasonablyclearandreliable
contractastocrucialrightsunderlyingtheirrelationship.
A. Property Division
Inmuchthesamewaythatcourtscangrantannulmentswithoutrecognizinga
validmarriage, theycanprovidejudicialroutesforpropertydivisionwithoutdeeming
127 See JohnS. Herbrand, Annotation, Right to Allowance of Permanent Alimony in
Connection with Decress of Annulment, 81 A.L.R.3d281 (1978).
128 Id. (citingPennamanv. Pennaman, 112 S.E. 829 (Ga. 1922)).
129 See, e.g., ElizabethLopatto, Unmarried Couples LivingTogether is NewU.S. Norm,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-04/un
married-couples-living-together-is-new-u-s-norm.html.
130 GeorgeL. Blum, Annotation, Property Rights Arisingfrom Relationship of Couple
CohabitingWithout Marriage, 69 A.L.R.5th219 (1997).
131 See, e.g., Posikv. Layton, 695 So. 2d759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
132 See id. at 76061.
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the property acquired during a marriage marital property.133 Whilethecaselaw
onsuchdivisionsfocusesonheterosexualcouplesinannulledmarriages, voidness
hasthesamemeaningacrossmarriagelaw, andthegenderpairingofthecouples
shouldhavenobearingontheprecedentialnatureoftheholdings.
In 1990 a West Virginia court found that the states public policy interest in
encouraging legal marriages should not be permitted to undermine a persons
equitable interests, nor a persons rights based upon a valid agreement, expressed
or implied.134 Thecourtthusallowedadivisionofpropertybetweentwounmarried
cohabitantswhohadlivedandbehavedasifmarried.135 Asdiscussedabove, the
rightofunmarried, cohabitingpartiestocontractisaconsistentthemethroughout
suchpropertydivisionlitigation.136
Tolocateanimpliedcontract, courtshavealsolookedtotheimplicationsofthe
parties behavior while in the relationship.137 PriortotheWestVirginiaruling, a
Minnesotacourtgrantedthegirlfriendofadeceasedmanaone-halfinterestinthe
hometheyhadsharedthoughthetitlelistedonlyhisname.138 Thecourtbasedits
decisioninafindingthatthetwopartieshadcontributedequallytothemortgage
andupkeepexpensesfortheproperty.139 In2003, Montanafurtheraddressedthe
factors behind this sort of contract theory, finding that the plaintiff, the defendants
formergirlfriend, hadnoclaim toanyshareofthevalueofthemobilehomeinwhich
shehadlivedwiththedefendant.140 Thecouplehadcohabitedonlyashorttimeand
133 Marital property is defined as property acquired after the date of the marriage and
before a spouse files for separation or divorce. Property, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1336
(9thed. 2009).
134 Goodev. Goode, 396 S.E.2d430, 438 (W. Va. 1990).
135 ThespecificlanguageoftheGoode courtapplied thisholding notgenerally to
presumptive marital partners, but to a man and woman . . . who have considered themselves
and held themselves out to be husband and wife. Id. However, keepinginmindthattheyear
ofthisdecisionwas1990, thirteenyearsbeforeMassachusettsbecamethefirststateto
recognizesame-sexmarriage, theprimaryfactorsaddressedbytheGoode courtaregender
neutral and equally applicable to homosexual couples: Such order may be based upon
principlesofcontract, eitherexpressorimplied, oruponaconstructivetrust. Factorstobe
consideredinorderingsuchadivisionofpropertymayinclude: thepurpose, duration, and
stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties. Id.
136 ManyofthesecasesrelyonMarvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d106 (Cal. 1976), aCalifornia
SupremeCourtdecisionthatfoundanoralagreementbetweenanunwed, cohabitingcouple
enforceableprovidedthatitdidnotrelyonanexchangeofsexualservices. I havechosennot
todiscussthiscaseindepthasitoriginatedinCalifornia, whichisnow astatewheresame-
sexcouplesmightlegallypursueadivorceandpropertydivisionthroughthatmoretraditional
means. However, the case is an important backbone of the judicial systems recognition of
certainpropertyrightsindependentofalegallyrecognizedmaritalrelationship.
137 Id. at110.
138 In re EstateofEriksen, 337 N.W.2d671, 674 (Minn. 1983).
139 Id.
140 Sheinv.Aiken,CDV-2001-752, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3368, at **56 (Nov. 18, 2003).
2014] VOIDED VOWS: ANNULMENT AS A SOLUTION 351
acquirednopropertytogether.141 Thecourtwentontonotethatevenifthesetwo
perceivedrequirementshadbeenfulfiled, theplaintiffwouldstilhavehadtheburden
ofprovidingclearandconvincingevidencethatsheandthedefendanthadintended
to establish a sort of constructive trust wherein one party would hold the prop-
erty in trust for the other who furnished the consideration for its purchase.142
Inordertoestablisharighttopostdissolutionpropertydivision, partiesmust
show bytheiractionsthattherelationshipresembledamaritalunion.143 Theclaim
willbestrengthenedbyevidenceofacontract, ortrust, intendingthepropertytobe
shared.144 Becauseamarriedsame-sexcouplehasperceiveditselfasmarrieddespite
thelawsofitsdomiciliarystate, theirrelationshipwilllikelyhavenotroubleof
meetingthefirstelementofproof. Whilethefindingofacontractwilinevitablyvary
casebycase, evidenceofinterdependentcontributionssuchasmortgagepayments,
homeupkeep, orfamilyinsurancecoveragewillgofartowardsdemonstratingthe
parties mutual understanding during their relationship.145
B. Spousal Support
Theissueofspousalsupporttakespostdissolutionrightsasteppastproperty
divisionasitcreatesalastingrelationshipbetweentheannulledparties.146 Itisalso
perhapsmorecontroversial, giventhataprimarypurposefororderingalimonyhas
beentopreventavulnerableex-spousefrom requiringthesupportofthestate.147
Historicaly, courtsrefusedtograntalimonyinanannulmentproceedingbecause, ab-
sentavalidmarriage, thereexistednobasisforafindingofsupportresponsibility.148
141 Id. at*6.
142 Id. (quotingOmerv. Omer, 523 P.2d957, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)). However,
findingthattheplaintiffhadprovideddefendantwithsomemoneyandworktowardsim-
provingthemobilehome, thecourtawardedherrestitutioninthatamount. Id. at **67.
143 See, e.g., In re EstateofEriksen, 337 N.W.2dat674.
144 See, e.g., id. at672.
145 See, e.g., id.
146 See Herbrand, supra note127.
147 Heres the reality: many [dependent divorced spouses] end up living
aroundthepovertylevel. Withoutsufficientalimonypayments, these
[individuals] become dependent on welfare (at taxpayers expense),
whichisexactlywhythealimonylawswerecreatedinthefirstplace
(samerationaleforchildsupport). Societydidnotwanttoberesponsible
to clean up peoples personal messes.
JeffLanders, In Many States, Alimony Reform Has Gone Too Far, FORBES (July12, 2011,
10:24 AM), http:/www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2011/07/12/in-many-states-alimony-reform
-has-gone-too-far/.
148 See generally Herbrand, supra note127. See also Williamsv. Williams, 97 P.3d1124,
1131 (Nev. 2004) (Absent an equitable basis of bad faith or fraud or a statutory basis, the
district court had no authority to grant the spousal support award.). However, some courts 
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However, withthegrowingacceptanceofnon-traditionaldomesticrelationships,
courtshaveincreasinglyrecognizedasupportrightbasedincontract149 thatmight
easilybeinvokedfollowingadecreeofannulment.
A partytoasame-sexannulmentseekingspousalsupportisbestsituatedto
applyforsuchpaymentsunderthedoctrinethathasbecomecolloquiallyknownas
palimony.150 In 1997, Florida enforced a lesbian couples promissory note evi-
dencingtheintentofonewomantoprovideherthen-partnerwithlifetimesupport.151
Atthecommencementoftheirrelationship, thepartieshiredalawyertodraftwhat
wasessentialyaprenuptialagreement, althoughtheycouldnothavelegalymarried.152
Usingastandardcontractlawanalysis, thecourtfound no fraud or overreaching153
onthepartofthepartnerwhohadinsistedontheformalizedagreement, anden-
forceditsterms.154
Same-sex couples in palimony actions have had to conquer courts prejudicial
tendencytostereotypehomosexualrelationshipsasoversexualized.155 Thesignifi-
cantissuewithplacinganemphasisonthesexualnatureofacontractualrelation-
shipisthelegalrequirementthatacontractisunenforceableifbaseduponthe
expectationofsexualservices.156 Decades prior to the states legalization of same-
sex marriage, a California court addressed the validity of a gay couples oral agree-
ment that in cohabiting they would combine their efforts and earnings and would
share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts.157 The
agreementfurtherstatedthatonepartnerwouldprovidefinancialsupportfortherest
of the other partners life in exchange for his render[ing] his services as a lover,
companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper and cook.158
haveallowedspousalsupportwherethevoidanceofthemarriagewasbasedonfraudor
otherfaultbyonlyoneparty. See, e.g., Cortesv. Fleming, 307 So. 2d611, 616 (La. 1973)
(holdingthat, wherethehusbanddidnottellhiswifethathewasalreadymarriedtoanother
woman, alimony is a civil effect of the marriage in favor of a good faith wife of that
putative marriage when the other party is in bad faith). However, when a same-sex couple
seeksanannulmentinthemarriagetrapscenariodiscussedbythisNote, fraudisunlikelyto
playarole. Rather, theywillseekthemarriagevoidedasinviolationofstatelaw.
149 See, e.g., Posikv. Layton, 695 So. 2d759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
150 Palimony is defined as [a] courts award of post-relationship support or compensation
forservices, money, andgoodscontributedduringalong-term nonmaritalrelationship, esp.
where a common-law marriage cannot be established. BLACKS LAWDICTIONARY 1219 (9th
ed. 2009).
151 Posik, 695 So. 2dat760.
152 Id.
153 Id. at762.
154 Id. at763.
155 See, e.g., Jonesv. Daley, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (Ct. App. 1981).
156 Id. at 13233.
157 Id. at131.
158 Id.
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Thewordchoiceoftheagreementprovedunfortunate;thecourtfoundthattheuse
of the word lover indicated one partners rendition of sexual services . . . an insepa-
rable part of the consideration . . . and indeed was the predominant consideration.159
Despite a proffering of alternate definitions for lover,160 thecourtinvalidatedthe
agreementanddeniedsupport.161 Thestereotypesopervadedinterpretationofthe
factsthatthecourtrefusedtoseverandenforceindividualsectionsofthecontract.162
Othercourtshavetakengreatercaretodistinguishanysexualrelationshipfrom
thelargerpurposeofadomesticcontract. Forexample, alesbianinFloridaseeking
toinvalidateanagreementshehadenteredwithherpartnerurgedthecourttotake
note of the parties sexual relationship.163 Thecourtrejectedthisargumentandheld
that even though the agreement was couched in terms of a personal services
contract, itwasintendedtobemuchmore. Itwasanuptialagreemententeredinto
by two parties that the state prohibits from marrying.164
Indicta, theFloridacourtnotedthatsuchagreementsshouldbeinwritingto
satisfytheStatuteofFrauds.165 Whilesucharequirementisnotuniform acrossthe
states, itisanadvisablelessontosame-sexcoupleslivinginjurisdictionsthatdonot
recognizetheirmarriages, asiscareinthedraftingofsuchagreementstoeliminate
anypotentialinterpretationofrequisitesexualexchange.
C. Child Custody and Visitation
Theissueofparentalrightsisuniquelycomplexinthecontextofsame-sex
familiesbecauseforavastnumberoftheseparentstheparentalrelationshiptothe
childdoesnotarisebiologically.166 Inthesituationwhereoneparenthaseither
conceivedthroughartificialinsemination, ordonatedsperm forasurrogatepreg-
nancy, theotherparentwillhavenogenetictietothechild. Evenwhereacouple
welcomesachildthroughadoption, insomescenariosoneofthespouseswillnot
159 Id. at133.
160 Id. ([A] person in love or an affectionate or benevolent friend.).
161 Id. at134.
162 Id. (Neither the property sharing nor the support provision of the agreement rests upon
plaintiffs acting as Dalys traveling companion, housekeeper or cook as distinguished from
actingashislover. Thelatterserviceformsaninseparablepartoftheconsiderationforthe
agreement and renders it unenforceable in its entirety.).
163 Posikv. Layton, 695 So. 2d759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
164 Id. at761. Inexchangeforfullfinancialsupport, onepartyagreedtogiveuphercareer
to maintain and care for the home. Id. at760.
165 Id. at762.
166 See, e.g., GaryJ. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, WILLIAMS INST.,
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-demographics-studies
/lgbt-parenting-in-the-united-states/(reportingthatsame-sexcouplesarefourtimesmore
likelytoadoptthanheterosexualcouples).
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have legal parenting rights. This is due to various state lawsas inconsistent as gay
marriage lawsthat prohibit adoption by same-sex couples.167 Theresultisfrequent
uncertainty as to one parents legal rights to the child.168 Whilecertainfederalstatu-
torymechanismsattempttoprotecttherightsofparentsinvolvedinhigh-conflict
maritaldissolutions, aswithpropertyrights, same-sexparentsaremostsecureunder
thelaw whentheyhaveenteredintoanexplicitparentingagreementattheonsetof
parenthood.169 Itisworthnotingthat, inthecontextofparentingrights, divorce
versusannulmentisnotparticularlysignificant.170 Beyondthescopeofsame-sex
families, courtsregularlydealwithcustodyofchildrenwhoseparentshavenever
married; the primary issue in these circumstances is the parents relationship with
thechild, ratherthantheirrelationshipwithoneanother.171 Despitethegeneralirrele-
vanceofannulmenttoparentalrights, thisNotenonethelessaddressesthetopicgiven
itslikelyimportancetomanysame-sexcouplesseekingmaritaldissolution.
A majorconcernforseparatedsame-sexparentsis, again, theinterstateinconsis-
tencyoflegalviewsongayrights. Inamaritaldissolutionscenario, theriskofone
partnerrelocatingwithouttheotherexacerbatesthisconcern. Courtshaveresponded
incongruouslytoadoptiveparentswhofindtheirparentalrightsdeniedafterrelocat-
ingtoastatewhereadoptionbyhomosexualcouplesislegallybarred. A distinct
circuitsplitremainsastothisissue. In2007, theTenthCircuitheldthattheFF&CC
requiredinterstaterecognitionofanadoptiondecree, eveniftheadoptioninques-
tionwouldhavebeenimpossibleunderthelawsofthestatenow consideringit.172
Thecourtwentevenfurther, findingthattheOklahomastatutethatdeniedrecogni-
tiontoout-of-statesame-sexadoptionswasunconstitutionalasaviolationofthefull
faithandcreditrequirement.173
Yet, in2011, theFifthCircuitcamedowninthereverse, permittingLouisiana
todenyenforcementofaNew Yorkadoptiondecreebecauseasame-sexcouple
wouldnothavebeenpermittedtoadoptunderLouisianalaw.174 Thecourtreliedon
thepublicpolicyexceptiontotheFF&CC.175 TheFifthCircuittherebydecidedthat
167 See 50States of Adoption, FAM. EQUAL. COUNCIL, http://www.familyequality.org/get
_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption/(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (notingthat
[o]nly 19 states and D.C. permit same-sex couples to adopt and that [o]nly 6 states
explicitly ban discrimination based on sexual orientation in foster care).
168 See id.
169 TheHumanRightsCampaignrecommendsthatsame-sexcoupleswithchildrendraft
co-parentingagreementsandcustodyagreementsthatanticipatewhatthefamilywilllook
likeshouldabreak-upoccur. See Second Parent Adoption, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/second-parent-adoption(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
170 See id.
171 UNIF.CHILDCUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENTACT, 9(1A) U.L.A. 657 (1999).
172 Finstuenv. Crutcher, 496 F.3d1139, 1156 (10thCir. 2007).
173 Id.
174 Adarv. Smith, 639 F.3d146, 150 (5thCir. 2011).
175 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §103 (1971).
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thelawsofthestatewherethecaseisbrought, andnottheConstitution, determine
thebenefitspartiesmayclaim from ajudgmentrenderedinanotherjurisdiction.176
Subsequently, therehasnotbeenanationalconsensusontheinterstateenforcementof
adoptiondecreeswheresame-sexcouplesaretheadoptiveparents.
Ifthecouplehasreceivedacustodyorder, butastateoutsidetheorderingjuris-
dictionrefusestoacknowledgeit, thedisenfranchisedparentmayseekinterstateen-
forcementundertwomainauthorities. ThefirstistheParentalKidnappingPrevention
Act(PKPA), whichmandatescross-jurisdictionalrecognitionofchildcustodyorders
topreventoneparentfrom fleeingwiththechildtoastatethatwouldenteranew
award more favorable to that parents interests and overturn the other parents rights.177
CongresslikelydidnotinitiallydevisethePKPA in1980 withsame-sexparenthood
inmind. However, becauseitissoeasytofindastatethatwillfavorabirthparent
orprimaryadoptiveparentoveranothersame-sexparent,178 thesetypesofrelation-
shipspresentanepitomicriskofthescenariotowhichthelaw responds. Asaresult,
thePKPA isausefultoolforadoptiveparentswhohavelostaccesstotheirchildren
acrossstatelines.
ThesecondauthorityistheUniform ChildCustodyJurisdictionandEnforcement
Act(UCCJEA), whichexpandedthePKPA byclarifyingquestionsofjurisdictional
priority.179 Specifically, theUCCJEA reinforcesthejurisdictionalrequirementsa
statemustmeettoassertitspoweroveracustodydispute.180 UndertheUCCJEA,
therearetwowaysforastatetohavejurisdictionovercustodyorders: (1) ifitwas
the home state of the child when custody proceedings began, or had been the childs
homestatewithinsixmonthsbeforeproceedingsbegan, andthechildwasremoved
from thestatebyapersonclaimingcustody, whileanotherparentcontinuestoreside
inthestate;or(2) ifthechildhasasignificantconnectiontothestate, andacourt
ofanotherstatedoesnothavejurisdictiononthefirstgrounds, orhasdeclinedto
exercisejurisdiction.181
Theseguidelineshaveprovenusefulinresolvingparentalrightsconflictsamong
separatedsame-sexcouples. Inthe2008 caseMiller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, the
VirginiaSupremeCourtinvalidatedaVirginiaordergrantingsolecustodytoabio-
logicalmother, basingitsrulingonthedominantauthorityofapreviouslyexisting
Vermont order, which provided visitation to the mothers former partner.182 Lisa
Miller-JenkinsandJanetMiller-JenkinshadlivedtogetherinVirginiawhereLisa
176 Adar, 639 F.3dat161.
177 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2014).
178 See id.
179 UNIF.CHILDCUSTODY JURISDICTION ANDENFORCEMENTACT, 9(1A) U.L.A. 657 (1997).
180 Id. §201.
181 Id.
182 The same-sex relationship in this case originated prior to any states legalization of
same-sexmarriage;insteadthepartieshadenteredintoacivilunionaspermittedbyVermont
law in2000. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 82425 (Va. 2008).
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gavebirthtoadaughterthroughartificialinsemination.183 Whenthechildwastwo
yearsoldthefamilyrelocatedtoVermont, wheretheyresidedforoveroneyearuntil
Lisafiledtodissolvetheunionandpetitionedforparentalrights.184 TheVermont
courtgrantedLisatemporarycustodyasthebiologicalmother, withvisitationrightsto
Janet.185 Shortlythereafter, LisarelocatedwithherdaughtertoVirginia, whereshe
filedanew petitiontoestablishparentage.186
TheVirginiaCourtofAppealsultimatelyfoundthatthePKPA affordedVermont
governingjurisdictionoverthecustodydispute, andtheVirginiaSupremeCourt
upheldthatdecision.187 Althoughtheprecedentialvalueofthiscaseisunclear,188 it
offerssomeunderstandingofthehopeapre-existingcustodyorderintherightstate
canprovidetoanotherwisedisadvantagedsame-sexparent. Inthiscasethecourt
lookedtoajudicialorderasabasisforgrantingcustodyrights.189 HadtheVermont
ordernotexisted, Janetwouldhavebenefitedfrom draftingaparentingcontractwith
Lisawhiletheirrelationshipwasstillstable.
Thesituationissomewhatmoredifficultforasame-sexpartnerwhohasplayed
aparentalroletowardachildbutisneitherthebiologicalparentnoradoptiveparent,
andthushasnoclearlegalrole. Custodyandvisitationclaimsbroughtbytheseindi-
viduals confront obstacles arising from statutory definitions of the word parent,190
andacommonpresumptioninfavorofdecisionsmadebythebiological(orlegally
adoptive) parent.191
Courtsareincreasinglymovingagainstthelatertrendstofocusprimarilyonwhat
isinthebestinterestofthechild, along-codifiedstandardinmoststates. In2004, a
Maine court determined that the biological mothers former partner was a de facto
parenttoherchildandthereforehadstandingforcustodyandvisitation.192 Thecourt
183 Id. at824.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. TheVirginiacircuitcourtfoundthatanyclaim Janethadtoparentalstatuswas
basedonrightsVermontaffordedtosame-sexcouplesincivilunions, whichwerenot
recognizedunderVirginialaw. VermontrefusedtogivefullfaithandcredittotheVirginia
courts holding; the parties appealed both decisions. Id. at 82425.
187 Id. at827.
188 Id. (applying law of the case doctrine, the court determined that nothing decided on a
firstappealcouldbereexaminedonasecondappealandrefusedtoreachthemeritsofthecase).
189 Id.
190 See generally LeahC. Battaglioli, Comment, Modified Best Interest Standard:How
States Against Same-SexUnions Should Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitation Disputes
Between Same-SexCouples, 54 CATH.U.L.REV.1235,1256(2005) (For example . . . the court
focused on the definition of parent under Tennessee law, which is defined as any biological,
legal, adoptive parent(s) or . . . stepparents. (citing TENN.CODEANN. §36-1-102(36) (2001)).
191 See id. (Some courts presumptively favor the biological or adoptive parents decision
to terminate entirely the former same-sex partners visitation rights by denying the former
partner standing, unless the biological or adoptive parent is unfit.).
192 See C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d1146, 1146 (Me. 2004).
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noted that a de facto parent must be limited to those adults who have fuly and com-
pletelyundertakenapermanent, unequivocal, committed, andresponsibleparental
role in the childs life, but declined to establish an exact standard of determination
forthisform ofparenthood.193 Takingadifferentapproach, in2001 aPennsylvania
courtappliedthedoctrineofin loco parentis194 to grant the biological mothers
formergirlfriendthird-partystandingforcustody.195 Thecourtfoundthatthepartner
hadestablishedherselfasaparentbyherinteractionswiththechild, whichincluded
takinghertodaycare, stayinghomefrom workwhenthechildwassick, caringfor
herexclusivelywhenthebiologicalmotherwastraveling, andtakingvacationswith
thechildandbiologicalmother.196
Other courts have focused on the biological parents actions as indicating an
intenttofosteraparentalrelationshipbetweenaformerpartnerandchildduringthe
marriage. In2010, Kentuckyheldanon-legalsame-sexparentpetitioningforcustody
toasignificantlystricterstandardthanthatseeninthePennsylvaniacase.197 Therele-
vant state statute limited de facto parents to the primary caregiver for, and financial
supporterof, achildwhohasresidedwiththepersonforaperiodofsix(6) months
or more if the child is under three years of age.198 Applyingthislanguage, astate
appellatecourtdeniedthenon-biologicalparentanyparentalrights, buttheSupreme
CourtofKentuckyreversedonafindingthatthebiologicalparenthadwaivedher
superiorparentalrightswhensheexpressedtheintentionofbecomingaco-parent
alongsideherpartner.199
In 2000, prior to New Jerseys legalization of same-sex marriage, a New Jersey
courtappliedageneralbestinterestofthechildstandardtoestablishavisitationright
as to the biological mothers former partner who had built a psychological parent
relationshipwiththechildren.200 In addition to focusing on the childs perspective
and needs, the New Jersey courtlike Kentuckyalso analyzed the actions of the
193 Id. at1152.
194 The phrase in loco parentis refers to a person who puts oneself in the
situationofalawfulparentbyassumingtheobligationsincidenttothe
parentalrelationshipwithoutgoingthroughtheformalityofalegaladop-
tion. Thestatusofin loco parentis embodiestwoideas;first, theassump-
tionofaparentalstatus, and, second, thedischargeofparentalduties.
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 91718 (Pa. 2001)(citations omitted).
195 Id.
196 Id. at915.
197 See Mullinsv. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d569, 573 (Ky. 2010).
198 Id. (citingKY. REV. STAT. 403.270(1)(a)).
199 Id. at 58081.
200 Attheheartofthepsychologicalparentcasesisarecognitionthatchildren
haveastronginterestinmaintainingthetiesthatconnectthem toadults
wholoveandprovideforthem. Thatinterest, forconstitutionalaswell
associalpurposes, liesintheemotionalbondsthatdevelopbetween
familymembersasaresultofshareddailylife.
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d539, 550 (N.J. 2000).
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childs biological parents and their implication for the overall parenting scheme.201
Thecourtfoundthatwhenalegalparenthasgivenparentalauthoritytoanon-legal
parent and the actions have had a lasting effect on the childs life, then the best interest
ofthechildtakespriorityoverthepreferencesofthebiologicalparent.202
Asmentionedabove, unlikepropertyandsupportrights, parentingrightsfor
separatedsame-sexcouplesarevirtuallynondependentonthemeansbywhicha
couplehasdissolvedtheirunion.203 Thisdifferencehasitsprosandcons. Onthe
positiveside, pursuinganannulmentisnotacomplication;courtsareunlikelyto
determineparenthoodbasedonwhetherornotalegalmarriageeverexisted. Onthe
negativeside, same-sexparentswillfindthattheyareessentiallycompelledtoantic-
ipatetheendoftheirrelationshipbecausecontractedparentingagreementsarethe
most effective and reliable means of protecting a non-legal parents rights in a con-
tentiousfamilybreakdown. Whilethismayseem troubling, itissimplyavariation
on the traditional prenuptial agreement, and a preferable alternative to losing ones
roleasaparent.
D. Federal Benefits
Theissueoffederalbenefitsforsame-sexcouplesissomewhatunclearbecauseof
itsyouth, butitisnotaweaklinkintheargumentforannulmentasastrongalternative
to same-sex divorce. The Supreme Courts ruling in Windsor enforcedtherecogni-
tionofsame-sexmarriagesforfederalbenefitspurposes.204 Someofthesebenefits
extendtodivorcedspouses, heterosexualandhomosexualalike.205 Forexample, the
SocialSecurityAdministration(SSA) willsharesocialsecuritybenefitswiththe
beneficiarys former spouse when the marriage has been terminated through divorce,
providedtheformerspousemeetscertainqualifications.206 However, theSSA doesnot
entirelydiscloseannulledspousesfrom receivingbenefits;incertaincircumstances,
andprovidedspecificevidenceofthemaritalvoidance, annulmentmaystillallow
forsocialsecurityentitlement.207
201 Id. at 55152.
202 Id. at551 (citationomitted).
203 See supra PartIII.C.
204 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 269596 (2013).
205 See HowDoes a Divorced Spouse Qualify for Benefits?, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (10/31/2013
03:37 AM), http://faq.ssa.gov/ica/support/KBAnswer.asp?questionID=1984&hitOffset=425
+423+422+357+356+352+351+345+331+322+317+316+312+311+307+293+290+289+282
+270+251+244+243+233+218+194+185+184+180+175+154+145+138+137+134+124+120
+107+102+101+92+87+83+70+59+35+21+17+16+13+8+6+5+4+2&docID=6513.
206 Thedivorcedspousemust: (1) havebeenmarriedtothebenefittedspouseforatleast
tenyears;(2) beatleastsixty-twoyearsold;(3) beunmarried;(4) notbeentitledtohisor
herownhigherSocialSecuritybenefit. Id.
207 GN00305.135When Annulment Permits Initial Entitlement or Reentitlement, SOC.SEC.
ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2012), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200305135.
2014] VOIDED VOWS: ANNULMENT AS A SOLUTION 359
Otheragenciessimilarlyallocatebenefitstoannuledcouplesonparwiththeir
divorcedcounterparts, albeitinvaryingdegrees. TheFederalOfficeofPersonnel
Management(OPM) willaffordhealthinsurancetotheformerspouseofafederal
employeewhosemarriagehasbeenterminatedthroughannulment.208 Under OPMs
policy, ex-spousesofformerfederalemployeesmaybeeligibleforcontinuingbenefits
throughtheSpouseEquityAct.209 Whiletheofficeoftheemployedspousedefinitively
determineseligibility, therighttobeconsideredextendsequallytomarriagesthat
haveendedasaresultofdivorceorannulment.210 The governments Thrift Savings
Plan, acontribution-basedretirementfundforFederalemployees, alsoallowsforthe
division of an account upon court order atanystageofadivorce, annulment, or
legal separation.211
Yetotherbenefitsgetnullified along with themarriage. Forinstance, the
Internal Revenue Service instructs taxpayers that[i]f [an individual] obtain[s] a court
decreeofannulment, whichholdsthatnovalidmarriageeverexisted, [theindividual
is] considered unmarried even if [he or she] filed joint returns for earlier years.212
Atsuchanearlystageinthefederalrecognitionofsame-sexmarriages, itremains
tobeseenwhetherthegovernmentwilldevelopitsapproachtoannulledunions
giventheinaccessibilityofdivorceformanycouples. Itseemslikely, though, that
ifthegovernmentacknowledgessame-sexmarriageasalegalrelationshiponequal
footingwithheterosexualmarriage, thensame-sexcoupleswhohaveannulledtheir
marriageswillinheritthesamerightsavailabletooppositesexcoupleswhoseunions
havebeendeclaredvoid. Thatis, benefitsdeterminedonanagency-specificbasis.
E. Overall Status of Post-Annulment Rights
Astheprecedingdiscussionexplains, courtsdonotstreamlinepost-annulment
rightsinthesamewaythatdivorceproceedingsalow forthestraightforwardsetling
of a couples affairs.213 Thisdoesnot, however, meanthatpartiestoanannulmentare
withoutjudicialmeanstoseparatetheirproperty, establishsupportobligations, con-
firm parentalroles, orreceivefederalbenefitsarisingfrom maritalstatus. Toclaim
208 Termination, Conversion and Temporary Continuation of Coverage, OFFICE OF PERS.
MGMT., https:/www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/reference-materials/reference
/termination-conversion-and-temporary-continuation-of-coverage/#formerspous(lastvisited
Oct. 23, 2014).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Changes in Your Family Status:Divorce, Annulment, and Legal Separation, THRIFT
SAV.PLAN, htps:/www.tsp.gov/lifeevents/spouse/separation.shtml(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
212 FilingStatus, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/ch02
.html#en_US_2013_publink1000170740 (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014). Taxpayersinthissituation
are additionally required to file amended tax returns as single or head of household status
foralltaxyearscoveredbytheannulment. Id.
213 See supra Parts III.AD.
360 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:331
theserights, though, acoupleonthevergeofannulmentwillbestsituatethemselves
forequitabletreatmentiftheycandemonstratethattheirrelationshipwasovertly
characterizedbysomelevelofcodependencyandmutualcontributionor, insome
cases, one partys sacrifice in expectation of the other partys support.214 Inother
words, thecouplemustdemonstratethattheylivedasmarriedpeople, eventhough
thestatedidnotrecognizetheirmarriage. Thesehybridclaimsthatwillinvolve
variouscombinationsofpalimony, defactoparenthood, contractlaw, andequitable
distributionarenotideal, butcertainlymanysame-sexcoupleswouldfindthese
mechanismspreferabletoremainingtrappedinanunwantedmarriage, unableto
attainlegalacknowledgmentasmarriedbutstillalsounabletoextricatethemselves
from thatstatus.
CONCLUSION
Same-sexmarriagesareatriskforinjuryfrom thesamesortsofinterpersonal
disagreementsandemotionalconflictsthatheterosexualcouplesface. Peopleare
people, andthereisnoreasonforanyonetobelievethatsame-sexcoupleswilllead
astatisticallymoreblissfulmarriedlifethanopposite-sexcouples.215 Unfortunately,
courtsinmini-DOMA stateshaveperceivedthedissolutionofahomosexualmar-
riageasembodyingmoremeaningthanjustthedisbandingofafamily.216 Statesthat
opposethelegalizationofsame-sexmarriageareapprehensivethatrequestsfor
divorcebysame-sexcoupleswedrightfullyinanotherjurisdictionareactuallyan
underhandedmeansofcompellingthestatetoacquiescetothelegitimacyofa
marriagebetweentwowomenortwomen.217 TheUnitedStatesisacountrybuilton
certaincoreprinciples, andanunavoidableeffectofthatphilosophyisthatintimes
ofcontroversytwoormoreofthesewell-foundedandingrainedprincipleswilcollide.
Theissueofsame-sexdivorcecomesdowntoawarbetweenindividualrightsand
federalistideals.218
Giventheironfistofthepublicpolicyexception,219 itseemspossiblethata
nationallegalizationofsame-sexdivorcewilloccuronlyastheproductofanational
legalizationofsame-sexmarriage. Theproposedinterim solutionstothisproblem
214 See supra notes 14754 and accompanying text.
215 See Green, supra note9.
216 See Talbot, supra note27.
217 See Lithwick& West, supra note14.
218 Whilesame-sexrelationshipsarerelativelynewtothefederalism debate, divorceitself
isnot. Thelawhasalwaysconstrueddomesticconcernsastherealm oftheindividualstates,
andfrom thebeginningofAmericanhistorythecoloniesweredramaticallydividedintheir
approachestomaritaldissolution. See AnnLaquerEstin, Family LawFederalism:Divorce
and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 38384 (2007).
219 See Koppelman, supra note28, at936 (notingthatthepublicpolicydoctrinehasits
rootsintheMiddleAges).
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requirealargedoseofpatience.220 Theycallforrevisionsofstatestatutesandradi-
calydifferentinterpretationsofjurisdiction, afundamentalconceptinAmericancivil
procedure.221 ThisNoteinsteaddrawsattentiontoannulmentasanaccessibleand
competentalternativetodivorcethatalreadyexistswithinstatutorylawandpresents
noaffronttofederalism orthepublicpolicyexception.
ThisNotedoesnotmeantosuggestthatannulmentisaperfectmeansofmarital
dissolutionforsame-sexcouples. Indeedsuchamethodofdissolvingaunionrequires
the couple to accept a courts declaration that their marriage never existed.222 For
peoplewhowaitedyearsfortheopportunitytowedlegally, thislegalfictionmay
seem morelikeapunishmentthanareleasefrom afailedmarriage. ThisNoteseeks
toacknowledgethatfeeling, andtheveryreasonablereluctancetowhichitmaylead,
whilesimultaneouslyemphasizingannulmentasthemostefficientandpracticalve-
hicleforterminatingasame-sexunioninarulingthatwillearnfullfaithandcredit
acrossstatelines. Foraslongasthemarriagelawsinthiscountryremaindissonant,
and [d]ivorces are made in heaven,223 adeclarationofannulmentwilloffersame-
sexcouplesajurisdictionalyconsistentprocessforescapingafailedrelationshipand
thetroublesomeconsequencesofamarriagetrap.
220 See supra notes 1526 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 1526 and accompanying text.
222 As discussed throughout this Note, the legal definition of annulment provides that [a]n
annulment establishes that the marital status never existed. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 106
(9thed. 2009);see also Wedgwood, supra note80.
223 See WILDE, supra note1, at255.
